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This article analyses the responses of unionists and nationalists to the arrival of American forces in Northern Ireland in
January 1942, and how traditional narratives, particularly those dealing with links to the United States, were reordered in the
light of this development. For unionists, it was an opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to the war effort and reinforce a
sense of Britishness, particularly after efforts in 1940 to end partition in return for Éire’s entry into the war. In addition, it
offered the possibility to forge a bilateral relationship with the United States, by being a good ally and resurrecting links
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On 26 January 1942, a hurried welcome party assembled at Belfast’s Dufferin Dock to greet American servicemen who, as part
of Operation Magnet, were the first to formally step onto European soil.1 The Ulster Rifles’ band struck up the ‘Star Spangled
Banner’ as the Americans walked down the gangplank; officially the first ashore was Milburn H. Henke of Minnesota, but amid
the rigmarole of preparing Henke for the history books, another ship had docked nearby and was already landing troops as
greetings were being made.2 Henke, who would receive three hundred pieces of fan mail, had a German-born father and a
mother of German origin and told reporters that he had ‘come to give the Germans hell’; he had no idea where he was going
until a British sailor pointed out the Irish coastline.3 The crowd grew during the day as news of the Americans’ arrival spread
and the disembarkation continued. The Ulster Rifles played ‘The Stars and Stripes Forever’ and ‘Liberty Bell’, while the
Americans sang ‘Marching Through Georgia’ on their way to their barracks.4
The arrival of Americans marked a major turning point in the war and helped lift two years of British despair, but it also had a
particularly local impact in Northern Ireland as it delighted unionist politicians and newspapers and outraged their nationalist
counterparts in almost equal measure. The reaction of ordinary Protestants and Catholics was much more phlegmatic, with the
former understandably pleased and the latter more ambivalent than openly hostile towards the Americans.5 This article will
analyse the ways in which unionist and nationalist spokesmen, with partition as their focal point, formulated responses and re-
evaluated their relationships with the United States, with unionists suddenly rediscovering historic bonds with the country while
nationalists, throughout Ireland, felt betrayed by a presumed traditional ally, but their hyperbolic reaction served to further
fortify partition. For unionists, it had the unanticipated benefit of further integrating Northern Ireland within the British war effort
and an opportunity to project a sense of Britishness akin to the rest of the United Kingdom.6 As will be demonstrated, the
Americans had barely set foot on dry land before these competing agendas tried to exploit their presence. The primary focus
of this piece, therefore, will be the ways in which these modified narratives were utilised in response to the American presence,
providing as it did a new – and brief – public forum for arguments about the rights and wrongs of partition; it will also examine
the consequences of the arrival on local politics.
Nationalism was broadly united by partition, but the war exposed its self-defeating insularity, whereby its spokesmen viewed
world events almost exclusively through the lens of partition. Conversely, unionism profited from the war, as Northern Ireland’s
role not only strengthened the union but American intervention also enabled unionism to see a world beyond king, union and
empire. For the first time, Northern Ireland’s government at Stormont attempted to cultivate a positive awareness of Northern
Ireland within the United States. It did this by highlighting Ulster’s role in American history and, through depicting Northern
Ireland as a loyal ally and a generous host, distinguished itself from neutral Éire. The war was, furthermore, a chance to
challenge the perceived duplicity of the British, specifically, the return of the ‘Treaty ports’ to Éire in 1938 alongside serious
discussions, which all but excluded unionists, to end partition in return for Éire’s entry into the war in June 1940, angrily
labelled ‘treachery’ by Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister James Craig.7 An altogether vaguer proposition came in December
1941, immediately after Pearl Harbor, when Churchill telegraphed Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of Éire, the American-born
Éamon de Valera telling him it was ‘now or never’, which initially appeared to be a renewal of the earlier offer; however, de
Valera was justifiably suspicious, and Churchill quickly backtracked.8 These discussions stoked unionist paranoia but also,
crucially, their failure enhanced Northern Ireland’s strategic value. In addition, the wartime experiences which Northern Ireland
shared with the rest of the United Kingdom, starting with the Belfast Blitz and culminating in the presence of the Americans,
made it demonstrably more ‘British’ by the end of the conflict than at any time since 1921.
These circumstances raised the prospect of Northern Ireland forging a bilateral relationship with the United States,
independent of Britain and distinct from Éire. Both unionists and nationalists would discover, however, that the American
‘occupation’ was purely strategic and that the United States had little interest in Northern Ireland beyond its convenient
geography. The main consequences of this and the war more generally for Northern Ireland would be a widening chasm
between it and Éire, making long-term reconciliation virtually impossible, closer ties with the rest of the United Kingdom, and
missing the admittedly outside opportunity to reconfigure local sectarian loyalties.
‘Don’t argue religion; don’t argue politics’
If the arrival of the American troops would not ultimately reshape the relationship between the United States and Northern
Ireland, these seemingly exotic young men certainly roused the curiosity of a war-weary country. The unionist press, principally
the Northern Whig, was first to try to exploit the propaganda potential of the Americans, asking those with Irish surnames (most
were mid-westerners, mainly of Swedish, Polish and Danish descent) about Éire’s neutrality. Although not briefed about
Northern Ireland, most of the Americans were savvy enough not to be compromised by leading questions.9 The indifference of
ordinary American soldiers about the political situation was not mirrored among their commanders, who, without ever
questioning their right to be in Northern Ireland, were acutely aware that this was no ordinary part of the United Kingdom. The
Americans were keen not to take sides, but they also realised that their men could become entangled in local frictions, either
by being attacked in nationalist areas or being seduced by the violent anti-British ideology of Irish republicanism, which saw
them banned from the Catholic Falls Road in Belfast.10 Subsequent deployments were forbidden from talking to the press and
were issued with a Pocket Guide to Northern Ireland.11 This 37-page booklet discussed local customs and how to behave,
stressing that there were ‘two Irelands’. Its most important advice consisted of ‘two excellent rules of conduct for the American
abroad. They are good rules anywhere but they are particularly important in Ireland: (1) Don’t argue religion; (2) Don’t argue
politics.’ With a sense of understatement that would have impressed the local sense of irony, it warned that ‘Irish history is
endlessly complicated’.12 Isolated incidents aside, the Americans generally avoided arguing religion and politics, and mixed
well with both communities.
On 23 December 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed where best to send American troops.13 Roosevelt harboured a
suspicion of a large American military presence in the United Kingdom but did suggest (or agree) that American troops could
garrison and defend Northern Ireland, while bombers would go to the British mainland.14 The decision was partly strategic and
partly political. It had a number of major strategic benefits, including freeing most of the British garrison for warzones such as
North Africa; it would create an American presence in Europe and the United States’ novice army would be able to continue
training.15 The growing Far East crisis at the start of 1942 was more urgent and, consequently, two of the four original
divisions earmarked were diverted there. Three other waves were sent to Northern Ireland during the next four months and
32,000 US soldiers would remain until eventually sent to North Africa in late 1942.16 These troops were not the only Americans
in Northern Ireland. As it was vital to the Battle of the Atlantic, American technicians had been working on docks and airfields
for months before Pearl Harbor under ‘Lend-Lease’.17 Plans for American army bases were in place as early as January 1941
and the Americans’ presence, ostensibly employed by the British government, was an open secret throughout the year.18
The Americans could, in theory, have been sent anywhere in the United Kingdom, relieved British troops and continued
training, while leaving Northern Ireland as it was. Northern Ireland was the one part of the United Kingdom where their
presence was likely to be controversial, due to Éire’s claim that it was part of its ‘national territory’ and refusal to recognise the
Stormont government, alongside centuries old sectarianism. More controversial, however, would have been the occupation of
Éire by British troops if the Germans invaded; in this eventuality, American aid would be much more palatable than that of the
ancient enemy.19 The British and Americans recognised privately that the latter’s forces might have to ‘be prepared to move
into South [sic] Ireland for the defense thereof’, something diplomatically difficult, if not impossible, for the British to do.20 Later
instructions stated that if an American invasion became a necessity, then any resistance would be suppressed quickly and
brutally.21 Éire’s army made the same calculations and was split between units on its southern coast to face a German
invasion, and the rest on the Irish border to resist the British and Americans if necessary.22
The political element was informed by personal enmities. Both Churchill and Roosevelt disliked de Valera, viewing him with a
mixture of exasperation, contempt and, as the war progressed, growing animosity.23 They particularly resented Éire’s
sometimes graceless neutrality, including failing to distinguish between the motivations of the Allies and the Axis. Placing
American troops in territory claimed by Éire, therefore, had the convenient bonus of riling a politician seen as, at worst, self-
defeating, and, at best, disingenuous, and someone who seemingly fostered Anglophobia to bolster his domestic political
position. That said, the Americans were not entirely dismissive of Éire’s sensitivities; for example, the force had the rather
unwieldy official title of ‘United States Army Forces in the British Isles’, shortened to USAFBI, as, noted the New York Times,
‘calling it the American Expeditionary Force would have likely affronted independent Éire’. The Americans were, nevertheless,
employing ‘a subtle form of pressure, using Irish-American sympathy to get what Éire has thus far been unwilling to grant’, in
other words, American access to the former treaty ports.24
‘The close kinship between the United States and Ulster’
There had been much speculation on both sides of the border about the imminent arrival of American troops; but as foreign
policy and defence were the responsibilities of London, Stormont was not consulted, merely informed of the decision.25
Stormont was overjoyed about hosting the Americans. It would reinvigorate the union with Great Britain, and thus secure
partition, by helping to integrate it within the broader war effort and it enhanced a sense of ‘Britishness’ (however loosely
defined) which unionists had been attempting, and failing, to foster since the inception of the state.26 James Loughlin argues
that due to sectarianism and the disputed creation of Northern Ireland, unionists struggled to create a sense of Britishness
consistent with the ‘national myth of tolerance, compromise and peaceful evolutionary development’, particularly as Northern
Ireland’s faults were public and plentiful. Due to the war, however, Stormont could appeal to unionist patriotism in a potentially
more effective way than the border issue had been in the 1930s. This had been employed pre-war, Loughlin asserts, ‘to
enforce political discipline among the Unionist population’ behind ‘a patriotic myth’, based around British symbols, ‘to simplify or
‘purify’, political debate in a context of virtually permanent constitutional crisis’.27 Loughlin’s analysis regarding the unionist
fear of being subsumed into a Catholic state can equally apply to the war, with the modification that, where previously the
rallying point for unionists had been negative, indeed, reactionary, they now had a wartime crisis, and the crucial role of
Northern Ireland within it, to construct and demonstrate a more ‘British’ Britishness. After the tentative British offers to Éire to
end partition in 1940, the American presence now presented Northern Ireland with a new and positive opportunity to ‘purify
political debate’, reliant on appeals to a generalised British sense of patriotism rather than sectarianism, enabling unionists to
both reassert their political dominance, and recast their Britishness, but without, as usual, any reference to discrimination
against the Catholic minority.28 This process arguably began with the Blitz (mirroring the mythical Blitz spirit), which gave
Belfast a shared experience with other British cities, continued with the Battle of the Atlantic and was further reinforced by
being the first UK region to host the Americans.
Stormont devised a multifaceted response to the Americans: firstly, on a practical level, it promoted good relations between
Americans and locals, especially Protestants, by creating hospitality committees.29 This would minimise tensions and friction,
reflect well on the government and aid the war effort. American troops were made, therefore, enormously welcome and
Stormont assiduously publicised, nurtured and memorialised these efforts, while downplaying the problems the Americans
generated.30 Secondly, and closely aligned, were formal and informal attempts to ingratiate the state with the Americans, by
being a good ally and indulgent host. Thirdly, Stormont, aided by unionist newspapers, strove to remind America, and educate
locals, about the historic bonds between the United States and Ulster, noting the twelve presidents of Ulster descent and the
role Ulstermen played in the revolution, and sought to capitalise on a low point in America’s relationship with Éire by ‘selling’
Northern Ireland in the United States.31 This latter aspect was not officially (and privately) articulated until 1943, after
correspondence between new Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke and David Gray, the sympathetic American minister in Dublin. 32
Finally, conscious of negativity surrounding Northern Ireland in the States, overt sectarianism was rare from Stormont and the
anti-Catholic bigotry of ministers, not least Brooke, was seldom aired in public.33
In all of this, however, there was little self-examination by Stormont; there were neither efforts to use the war to create a sense
of ‘Northern Irishness’, sheltering instead, as noted, behind a still vague Britishness, nor attempts to ameliorate conditions for
Catholics. These efforts, amid a shared crisis, may not have transcended sectarian divisions and but could have portended
future peacetime stability; the hiatus on blatant sectarianism did not, however, long survive the war. 34 The process of
ingratiating Northern Ireland with the United States was apparent throughout the ‘occupation’, but Brooke was much more
receptive to it than his aged and moribund predecessor, John M. Andrews, Northern Ireland’s inconvenient divisions were
airbrushed and replaced by propaganda which depicted the state, sometimes wistfully styled as ‘little Ulster’, as loyal and
homogeneous. This required a hurried resurrection of sentimental ties between Ulster and the United States; ties subsumed
into either Scots-Irish or Irish American Diasporas.35 These were now to be celebrated uncritically alongside apparently shared
values – such as democracy – in what the nationalist Derry Journal contemptuously dismissed as ‘the mushroom show of
specious regard that the Six County Ascendancy has now conceived for the American Republic’. 36 That the United States had
broken away from the cherished British Empire was conveniently ignored or summarily dismissed by unionist spokesmen: ‘into
the rights and wrongs of that struggle it is unnecessary now to enter’, was the Belfast Telegraph’s fudge when the topic
became unavoidable in its coverage of 4 July celebrations.37
In his official greeting to the Americans, Andrews, who had become prime minister upon Craig’s death in November 1940,
praised Roosevelt in joining the fight against ‘ruthless barbarianism’ and stressed that the American ‘presence is a reminder of
the close kinship  …  between the United States and Ulster’.38 At Stormont, Andrews re-emphasised transatlantic links as,
‘bonds that can never be broken – bonds created by kinship and language, identity and outlook, and a common faith in
democracy’. He also believed that the Americans would soon ‘experience the warm-hearted hospitality that is so characteristic
of our people’.39 As nationalists, bar the moderate T.J. Campbell, a former editor of the Irish News, refused to take their seats,
the only opposition at Stormont was the Northern Ireland Labour Party’s (NILP) two MPs. These, Jack Beattie, an anti-partition
Protestant, and Harry Midgely, who would eventually join the ruling Ulster Unionist Party, also greeted the Americans, Beattie
‘on behalf of the working class people of Northern Ireland’.40
The Americans created a welcome distraction for Stormont. Alongside its sectarian problems, Northern Ireland had suffered
from poverty, social division and generally poor government since well before the war, indeed, arguably since its inception. 41
Craig, prime minister since the state’s foundation, had become increasingly erratic, viewed by Brian Barton as ruling ‘in
characteristically dictatorial and whimsical fashion, major decisions being taken hastily by the Prime Minister himself, or after
consultations with a select inner clique’.42 Craig at least had the foresight to earmark the energetic Brooke as his successor;
however, the Ulster Unionist Party opted instead for the superannuated Andrews. Already seventy, one critic dismissed
Andrews as ‘just a provincial mill owner’, and he merely continued Craig’s policies with essentially Craig’s cabinet.43 Such was
the unpopularity of the government that Craig’s North Down seat was lost in March 1941 to an independent unionist.44 The
mishandling defence preparations prior to the Blitz of April and May 1941, which killed almost a thousand people and
destroyed much of Belfast’s housing stock, was, deservedly or not, seen as a reflection of incompetence of the Andrews
government and contributed to its eventual toppling two years later.45
‘Without permission’
The unionist press, primarily the News Letter, the Belfast Telegraph and the Northern Whig in Belfast and the Sentinel in
Londonderry, the former three working with Stormont, played a leading role in acclaiming the Americans and publicising Ulster–
American links.46 In its editorial marking the arrival, the Telegraph was effusive about the ‘great occasion’, declaring that ‘Mr
Roosevelt was never neutral in mind or heart’ before Pearl Harbor. 47 ‘Yesterday the citizens of Ulster learned with pleasure
and satisfaction that contingents have already arrived’, declared the Sentinel.48 The Sentinel also echoed Andrews’
sentiments about the ‘many ties of kinship which have long bound Ulster with the great Republic of the West’.49 The Telegraph
was quick to juxtapose reactions in Northern Ireland and Éire, remarking upon ‘the blaze of publicity’ in the British and
American press, while ‘the Dublin papers, cramped no doubt by the Censor’s blue pencil, have dismissed the historic event in
less than thirty lines’.50 Moreover, the Whig gleefully pointed out that de Valera had ‘received flattering comment’ in German
propaganda, which had declared: ‘the manly attitude of the Irish Premier shows that neutrality and independence are notions
that can be maintained by weak nations against stronger opponents’.51
Irish nationalist press’s response was in marked contrast. The two main papers were the Belfast-based Irish News and the
Derry Journal; smaller, regional nationalist papers followed their lead, however, without the vehemence of either. 52 Both, but
particularly the Journal, took grave exception to the American arrival. It reported at length about the protests of both de Valera
and local nationalist figures, and fully supported the former’s outrage against the deployment of American troops ‘without
permission’. The intemperate tone reflected not only a genuine belief in the wrongness of partition, and legitimate Catholic
grievances, especially in Londonderry, against Stormont, but also a wilful and persistent misrepresentation of partition’s
origins. In this narrative, partition was imposed without the consent of the Irish people rather than enshrined in the Anglo-Irish
treaty, signed by an Irish delegation and ratified by the provisional Irish parliament; moreover, arch anti-partitionist de Valera
had, in fact, voted for its continuation in 1925.53 Paul Bew sees this as indicative of the ‘self-referential culture of Irish
nationalism [which] was ill-equipped to rise to the moral challenges of world war’; for example, the lack of empathy with
European Jews and the notion that ‘the most oppressed people in Europe in the 1940s were to be found in Ireland’.54 This,
even assuming the indignation was genuine, is certainly the case regarding the Americans, yet it is also apparent that the
nationalist press saw the arrival as a way of internationalising partition, even if the rest of the world had more pressing
concerns.
De Valera was central to this and his widely reported protest focussed on the nationalist view that, as ‘everyone knew’, partition
had been imposed, ‘despite the expressed will of the Irish people’, by the British.55 He compared this to ‘the former partition of
Poland’ and invoked Lincoln’s determination to prevent the ‘Partition of the United States … even at the cost of fighting one of
the bitterest civil wars in history’.56 ‘The maintenance of the partition of Ireland’, he went on, ‘is as indefensible as aggressions
against small nations elsewhere which it is the avowed purpose of Great Britain and the United States in this war to bring to an
end.’57 The pro-de Valera Irish Press referred to this as a ‘statement’, while the rest of the Irish and international press spoke
of a ‘protest’.
Professor Douglas Savory, an English-born Unionist MP at Westminster and former history lecturer at Queen’s University,
Belfast, offered a virtual line-by-line rebuttal of de Valera’s statement, declaring it a distortion of facts ‘so extraordinary that it
was hard to believe that it was authentic’. In a letter to the Sentinel, he questioned the analogies between Poland, Norway,
Belgium, Holland or the American Civil War ‘and the deliberate and voluntary severance by the Twenty-Six Counties of
Southern Ireland from the United Kingdom’.58 He argued that personation, intimidation and abstentionism were widespread in
the 1918 general election that saw Sinn Fein, demanding an all-island republic entirely independent of Britain, emerge as the
largest party in Ireland, and hardly the mandate that nationalists claimed. He concluded that de Valera’s statement was ‘so
extravagant that it scarcely deserves to be taken seriously’.59 Regardless of some of the questionable aspects of the 1918
election, Sinn Fein’s mandate was indisputable, but Savory’s broader deconstruction of de Valera’s analogies was not without
merit.
British Ambassador Sir John Maffey, who reported to Gray that ‘he had never seen de Valera so depressed’, had informed De
Valera of the coming of the Americans. 60 At the end of January 1942, de Valera told the American, British and Canadian
representatives in Dublin that his words should not be viewed as a protest.61 John D. Kearney ​T​​the Canadian ​​​​Hih​​gh
​Commissionm​​em​r m​mminister​in ​D​​ublin recorded: ‘he felt obliged to make some statement in case silence be interpreted as
acquiescence in the status of partition. He also told me that he feared a worsening of relationships between Ireland and the
United States by reason of the presence of American troops’.62 This explanation was an unconvincing, if typically artful,
exercise in semantics, and the statement was made with seemingly little regard for the potential it had to inflame tensions in
Northern Ireland. De Valera’s words were certainly taken as a protest by the United States, particularly a furious Gray. He felt,
according to T. Ryle Dwyer, that ‘de Valera was playing petty politics in the midst of the war’, and wanted to impose sanctions
on Éire, but settled instead on the so-called absent treatment, an effort to sideline Éire diplomatically.63 Gray later reflected
that the protest ‘was probably inspired by internal political considerations or by Mr de Valera’s estimate of them’.64 Dwyer
views the American arrival as simply the pretext for another of de Valera’s ‘ritualistic denunciations of partition’, while Robert
Fisk states that the protest ‘achieved no purpose and was not expected to’, but its insensitivity angered the Americans by
implying a moral equivalence between the Allies and the Axis. 65 De Valera felt that his reaction was as temperate as could be
expected, but the Americans disagreed.66 Roosevelt later remarked, according to Robert Brennan, Éire’s minister in
Washington, DC, that ‘he was sorry Mr. de Valera had made the statement he did but, of course, he knew he had to make a
protest if only for appearance sake’, demonstrating the official American view of de Valera’s motivation.67
Thomas Bartlett, in his discussion of the 1940 offer of Northern Ireland to Éire, highlights de Valera’s cynicism: ‘whatever he
may have said in public, ending partition had never been a priority for de Valera’. Maintaining his supremacy within both Éire
and his own party, Fianna Fail, were de Valera’s priorities. He headed by far the largest party in Éire, but formed a succession
of minority governments; moreover, he faced threats from extremists within his party, who were even more anti-partitionist than
he was. Maintaining neutrality was much more important than partition for de Valera.68 The end of partition would have seen a
huge demographic shift with Ulster Protestants voting in the new state; therefore, as Bartlett concludes ‘De Valera’s sovereign
Ireland could not have survived the ending of partition, and de Valera knew it’.69 Gray confronted de Valera about partition,
noting that he would rather appease his own hardliners than seek conciliation with unionists, even if the latter could bring
about an all-island state.70 There was a further paradox as, while publically berating their arrival, de Valera privately facilitated
the return of American, and sometimes British, pilots grounded in Éire to their bases across the border, while Axis combatants
were interned for the war’s duration.71 Gray saw this as a tacit admission that de Valera’s protest was solely for public
consumption rather than evidence of genuine offence.72
De Valera’s protest was, ultimately, about saving face in the light of the uncomfortable and very public demonstration that,
regardless of his rhetoric or Éire’s irredentism, he had no say about events across the Irish border; he would have been
deluded to believe truly that the United States required his permission to land in Northern Ireland. The starkness of this
impotence would have been further reinforced had he said nothing, but it was a politically risky strategy. Maffey advised that
any public protest would likely create anti-Irish feeling in both Britain and America.73 This advice, and de Valera’s dubious
logic, did not prevent repeated claims that the entire island of Ireland as Éire’s sovereign territory, a constant irritation
throughout the war.74 Roosevelt was contemptuous about the protests. Brennan told Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles
that the presence of US troops ‘was regarded by the Irish government and people as official sanction of the partition of
Ireland’.75 There was also an understandable fear within Éire that America would invade the country. Roosevelt’s private
response was ‘that he only wished they would’.76
‘As welcome in Northern Ireland as the Germans are in Norway’
Andrews relished the opportunity to put one over de Valera, asserting that ‘Éire’s fate, as well as our own’ depended upon the
war’s outcome. As for partition, he cited the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, and blamed de Valera for partition and the
increasing divisions between Northern Ireland and Éire, making the entirely plausible observation that, ‘It is they who, by their
policy and actions both before and since the outbreak of war, have widened the gulf’. Andrews also condemned the ‘folly’ of
denying Britain access to Éire’s naval bases, as ‘Éire is no less danger of invasion’; by contrast, ‘Northern Ireland is in the fight
for freedom, and intends to see it through’.77 Andrews was able, then, to reassert that Northern Ireland’s commitment to the
war effort distinguished it from de Valera and Éire.
The 75-year-old unionist Mayor of Londonderry, Sir Frederick James Simmons, arose from his sickbed to welcome American
officers and dismiss de Valera’s ‘impudent protest’. He deemed de Valera’s objection ‘coming from a neutral source’, to be ‘in
utterly bad taste’, as de Valera had lost Northern Ireland in 1920 and ‘Britain was adhering to the bargain then made’.78 At the
civic reception for American officers at the city’s Guildhall, Simmons declared: ‘We don’t take any recognition of those who
think that you are here without being invited, because you are welcome guests’. Simmons also greeted the Americans in
Gaelic, a politicised language usually viewed suspiciously by unionists, with the Irishman’s welcome of ‘Céad mile fálte’ (‘a
hundred thousand welcomes’).79 Simmons owed his office to the gerrymandering of electoral boundaries which perpetuated
unionist rule, despite a nationalist majority in the city; it is doubtful, however, that he had this irony in mind when avoided
mention of liberty or democracy.80
Neither de Valera nor anyone else in Éire’s political establishment felt obliged to refute Andrews, Simmons or Savory. Éire’s
press reported none of this, technically, and politically conveniently, muzzled by strict censorship; thus, any engagement with
unionism would have implicitly legitimised it and Northern Ireland. De Valera’s protest was, nevertheless, a rare boon for
unionism, exposing his conceit that he was Ireland’s rightful ruler as the fallacy it was, and permitting unionist leaders to project
a positive image of a patriotic and steadfast Northern Ireland. The reality was, however, that the British and Americans could
operate with impunity in Northern Ireland, a geographically convenient pawn regardless of what unionists thought, and there
was nothing de Valera, Andrews or anyone else could do.
When Unionists endeavoured to recruit Westminster for their attacks on de Valera its public reaction was muted to the point of
silence. Savory raised the issue in the House of Commons, but the British establishment ignored the protests and made no
statement.81 When pressed, the Dominions Office confidentially told Stormont that it was not ‘necessary or desirable for them
to issue any reply’, which was not to be construed as ‘any way ignoring the position of Northern Ireland’. This was made clear
in December 1937 when the then Irish Free State’s new constitution laid claim to the whole island and renamed itself ‘Éire’. The
British government refused to ‘recognize that the adoption of the name “Éire” or “Ireland” …  involves any right of territorial
jurisdiction’ over Northern Ireland: ‘This remains the position’.82 The Dominions Office’s private assurances were doubtless
welcome, and would have partially assuaged unionist paranoia, but London deemed it altogether more politic to say nothing
publicly in the hope of future wartime co-operation with Éire.
Nationalists were largely ambivalent about the outcome of the war, the only wartime issue that raised hackles was conscription,
mooted but never introduced in Northern Ireland; otherwise, all that mattered was partition.83 The fervour of the anti-American
protests was, in effect, an attempted diversion from nationalism’s political frustrations, and the misassumption that America was
Ireland’s natural ally, as much as displays of genuine outrage. Reactions particularly in Londonderry illustrated this. Patrick
Maxwell, Nationalist MP for Foyle stated: ‘the Americans are as welcome in Northern Ireland as the Germans are in Norway’:
We shall ignore the American forces as far as possible, but there is no discourtesy intended. There is nothing
physically we can do to throw them out or we would do so. We consider the landings of the Americans is an
aggression against the Irish nation. The closest analogy would be if the Japanese landed in Occupied France to
help the Germans.84
Joseph E. Stewart, the Nationalist MP for East Tyrone proclaimed: ‘Mr de Valera’s declaration is shared by all Nationalists in
the six counties …  the people of Ireland should have been consulted before the army of another country, however friendly,
should have been brought into Irish soil. No Irishman ever agreed to the partition of Ireland’.85 Parochialism, misrepresenting
of history and contorted analogies served to demonstrate further the isolation of nationalists in Northern Ireland.
The Journal editorialised at length about the arrival of the Americans, ‘without any reference to the Irish government’, arguing
that it was contrary to America’s ideals and was, among many other complaints, propping up ‘Orange rule in this unnatural
enclave’. All other issues, including the war, were subservient to ending partition and as ‘the fact that the age-long aspirations
of National Sovereignty have been plainly impugned … the Irish leader could not do other than protest as he did’. As a result,
this notional leader was obliged not to accept anything ‘other than all Irish control of all the national territory’.86 Nationalist
protests, therefore, saw the Americans as explicitly supporting partition, but there is also the inference that had the ‘legitimate’
government been asked, then they would have been welcomed, which, of course, was entirely at odds with Éire’s neutrality
and, certainly at this point in the conflict, de Valera’s attitude towards the Allies. The protests also stressed friendly Irish–
American links and that these would not be risked by violence against American troops.
While the responses of the Journal and other voices within nationalism were predictable, some calmer heads saw them as self-
defeating in pursuit of their ultimate goal. W.S. Moody of Strabane wrote perceptively to the Journal complaining about ‘the
spectacle of leaders of Irish Nationalism helping to defeat the immediate or near future prospects of an all-Ireland Republic, by
alienating and antagonising American opinion’ which, he pointed out, had previously wrought concessions from the British. ‘To
gratuitously throw away further potential support and sympathy’, he continued, ‘for the sake of a national hyper-dignity to be
recognised by the world to some far distant and remote Utopian era … compels admiration for the heart but certainly not the
head’. He believed that de Valera’s co-operation with the Americans would have blindsided unionism and potentially fatally
undermined Stormont: ‘but no, the leaders of Irish Nationalism in their recently acquired dignity and status of neutrality can be
relied on to scorn all such base compromise … thus helping to assure and perpetuate Partition’. Instead, de Valera, Maxwell
and others were abetting unionism: ‘the fondness of Irish Nationalist leaders for making such defiant gestures and outbursts
exceeds their sincere desire for a united Ireland; otherwise they would not so patently allow their means to defeat their end’.87
Although ignoring the potentially huge cost of the war to Éire, Moody’s analysis was much more nuanced than anything offered
either nationalists or unionists and its publication in the staunchly nationalist Journal perhaps tacitly acknowledged this.
Certainly, it is barely conceivable that nationalist spokesmen genuinely believed that their bellicosity would garner American
support for their singular ambition, regardless of how aggrieved they claimed to be; moreover, they clearly overestimated Irish–
Americans’ commitment to their ancestral homeland and their importance in American politics.88
There was much publicity in the US about the arrival, both in newspapers and newsreels.89 Alongside cheery coverage of the
troops themselves and the positive impact upon British morale, the New York Times’ assessment was circumspect, recognising
the complexities of the situation. It explained that the ‘Sons of United States soldiers who had fought in World War I’ had ‘set
foot upon a troubled land.’ It also noted that American conscripts were in a place without conscription, and had come
into one of those small little trouble spots of the British Empire. It is industrial, mountainous and Tory – a British
controlled foothold on the island of Ireland. The Americans had landed in a strange country. It is proud and loud in
its declarations of fealty to Empire.90
This downbeat, and broadly fair, view hinted at the potentially problematic nature of the American presence and recognised
that Ulster’s doughty self-image was at odds with the reality of an impoverished, insular and divided country.
The Nation dedicated an entire supplement of its 31 January 1942 issue to Ireland. It reminded Éire of, among many things,
the role America played in Irish independence and The Nation’s wholehearted support for this, urging it to join the war effort in
due recognition. It warned that Éire ‘must inevitably forfeit American sympathy and support and take its place, when the war is
over, with the anti-democratic nations at the peace table’.91 The following issue included an article entitled ‘Irresponsible
Neutrality’, which described de Valera as ‘churlish’, contending that Éire’s ‘old grievances blind it to present dangers’, and
warning that partition could only end ‘by agreement with the Protestant majority … unless it is prepared to wage civil war and
kill, imprison, or deport 600,000 recalcitrants’.92 The war, it continued, had made Northern Ireland indispensable to Britain; in
fact, it was ‘very probably responsible for Britain’s continued existence’, which, in turn, made the likelihood of it being
abandoned to Éire even more remote.93
Other American newspapers were more confrontational. The New York Herald Tribune  highlighted the disparity between de
Valera’s outspokenness about the Americans’ arrival and his silence after the German bombing of Belfast in 1941. It referred
to his statement as
a gratuitous piece of impertinence. Éire has been treated very tenderly in this war. The devastating raids on
Belfast appear to have gone unrebuked in Éire, but when the United States troops landed in what is certainly de
facto belligerent territory, the protests came in battalions.94
Criticism also came from Congress, where, reported the Whig, ‘Congressmen of Irish extraction’ disagreed with de Valera.
Republican Congressman J. O’Brien of New York was ‘elated’ that American troops had arrived and ‘surely he [de Valera]
realizes that if Britain and America should fall, Éire will be at Hitler ’s mercy’. He felt that due to their strong links, Éire should co-
operate with the United States and set aside its differences with Britain.95 The Derry Journal, however, reported another
congressman complaining that the troops should have gone to the Philippines as ‘Britain had 3,500,000 men armed to the
teeth’, indicating the political dimension to the decision.96
‘Irresponsible or wrong-minded people might misinterpret this’
For all the bravura of unionists, paranoia about their status and London’s commitment persisted. At a meeting of the War
Cabinet’s Defence Committee concerning the imminent arrival, Andrews was
most anxious that no impression should be given that we were handing over responsibility for the defence of
Northern Ireland to the United States. Irresponsible or wrong-minded people might misinterpret this as the first
step to handing Northern Ireland over to Éire.97
Andrews’ concerns required, to say the least, not only a considerable leap of logic, and reflected not only his personal
insecurities and muddled reasoning but also as a still raw resentment of the 1940 offer to end partition. His request that some
British forces remain was granted, but it was in case sectarian violence erupted, exposing the persistent unionist view that
nationalists were not only disloyal but also a potential fifth column. Sir Alexander Maxwell, the Permanent Under-Secretary at
the Home Office, stated that ‘a proportion of British troops’ would remain in case of ‘civil disturbance’ as ‘it would be preferable
if these troops were British’.98 Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, an Ulsterman and Sir Basil Brooke’s uncle,
confirmed that ‘it was intended to leave British troops for liaison and internal security purposes’.99 There was an implicit fear
that, as in the Great War, violent Irish republicanism would foment trouble during an international crisis. The retention of some
British troops mollified Andrews.
British forces in Northern Ireland, therefore, could be deployed during civil strife but this was not something that could be
reasonably or realistically be expected of the Americans. Although the inference was that they could be called upon, it is
difficult to countenance a situation, beyond persistent Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacks on US troops, where they would
agree, or be sufficiently provoked, to do so.100 Unbeknownst to the British authorities, an American commander had informed
the IRA, through the US forces’ head Catholic Chaplain that their soldiers would remain uninvolved in Northern Ireland’s
internal problems.101 The terrorist organisation ignored this. The angry rhetoric of Irish nationalism offered a convenient
pretext for the IRA to launch a terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland in April 1942, while a manifesto found at an arms dump in
August explicitly threatened the Americans and its language reflected the earlier nationalist protests.102 The campaign failed
to embroil the Americans and was suppressed by the end of the year.
Unionism, like nationalism, avoided self-analysis in the wake of the American arrival and unionist politicians and newspapers
were content to project an unproblematised vision of Northern Ireland. To this end, the American presence was celebrated,
links between Ulster and the United States emphasised, while downplaying any negative aspects, such as petty crime and anti-
social behaviour, as was any hint of local disunity regarding the war effort. The unionist press reported some troops being
‘billeted with a ghost’, the arrival of ‘Doughgirls’, and later gave extensive coverage to 4 July celebrations and
Thanksgiving.103 The Telegraph began publishing a ‘Home News Corner for Americans in Ulster’ in February, and, from
December 1943, a local version of the US forces newspaper Stars and Stripes.104 At times, it was impossible to ignore
adverse consequences of the American presence, for example the acquittal in April 1942 of an American soldier of
manslaughter after shooting a bus driver whose vehicle strayed into a military convoy.105 Yet even this, and later killings,
served to reinforce American values as high-profile courts martial were open to the public, widely reported, and because
justice was perceived to be done, seemingly prevented rifts between Americans and locals.106 The scandal generated also
offered a welcome wartime distraction, as did visits from a steady stream of American celebrities and public figures.107
Ordinary Protestants and Catholics seemed much less interested in the constitutional implications of the American presence
than their newspapers and politicians; there was, nevertheless, a clear delineation between Protestants and Catholics ​
attitudes. The Ministry of Information (MOI) reported in September that ‘with a few honorable exceptions  …  . The welcome
given to the Americans has been overwhelming on the part of the Unionists and Protestants – those loyal to the British Crown
and resolved to maintain the British connection’.108 Tom Harrison, the head of Mass Observation, earlier stated that
Protestants were pro-American not only because their presence strengthened the war effort, but also because they served,
‘almost unconsciously as a strengthening of the forces of order against the constant fear of Catholic (Nationalist) trouble’.
Catholics were ‘largely antagonistic, although it is only a minority who are strongly so, many individual Catholics are thoroughly
in favour of the Americans’.109 The US consul in Belfast, the recently arrived Parker Buhrman, in an early report to Gray
reached similar conclusions, stating that the Americans were well received by both communities.110 Buhrman worried
constantly, however, about Americans being drawn into local problems. By September, he was reporting that ‘Quite a number’
of Americans being ‘brutally assaulted under the cover of darkness’ by ‘IRA partisans’, while ‘Irish American soldiers also lend
ready ear to IRA trouble makers’.111 This concern was exaggerated by largely unfounded fears, from both Stormont and the
Americans, that Irish–American soldiers would be susceptible to Irish republicanism.
‘Céad mile fálte?’
The fanfare from unionists and handwringing of nationalists was absent from subsequent American deployments, starting in
March 1942, and the interest of local newspapers even when Americans arrived in huge numbers from late 1943 was
comparatively subdued. This was partly because the military did not want to make a fuss, but also suggested that the earlier
competing declarations of unionists and nationalists were as much for public display as they were about principle.112 Stories in
the unionist press about American reactions to the idiosyncrasies of Ulster life continued, as did good-natured items about
mutual culture shock, but newspapers only propagandised the initial arrival. Brawling, drunkenness and minor criminality
continued, but only occasionally against a sectarian backdrop, for example, when young men on the Falls Road, purportedly
members of the IRA, taunted Americans after their defeat to the Germans at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in February 1943. 113
On the surface, the experience of Northern Ireland in many respects resembled the rest of the United Kingdom, in that the
Americans were ‘overpaid, oversexed and over here’ even while sectarianism remained a reduced, if still very real, feature of
life and this added dimension continued to set the region apart and complicated the American presence.114
Northern Ireland fell into a wartime routine where the Americans were a familiar sight; a routine that would be punctuated by
industrial unrest but never directly threatened again by the conflict. Its comparative security, particularly after the Battle of the
Atlantic, removed it from the frontline and it became a diplomatic and strategic sideshow.115 The Americans, nevertheless, still
had to be managed as well as eulogised. Stormont, led by a tireless Brooke and given virtual independence by London, set
about this with gusto and no little skill. Beyond coping with the practical and social problems generated by the influx of tens of
thousands of young men, Stormont had to adjust policing and cede legal jurisdiction over US troops. It also had to contend with
American race relations, amend some of Northern Ireland’s more archaic social mores (opening cinemas on Sunday, for
example) and provide enough entertainment to try to keep Americans away from booze and loose women, all of which it did as
well as, and often better than, the rest of the United Kingdom.116
The arrival of the Americans certainly strengthened partition, which helped explain nationalism’s often-histrionic response and
unionism’s unbridled joy. Northern Ireland’s role in the war, and Éire’s neutrality, made the end of partition in its aftermath even
more unlikely; as Hennessey argues, the war ‘reinforced the psychological gap between Ulster unionism and Irish
nationalism’.117 The American presence, at least at the outset, shone a useful spotlight on Stormont’s double standards, even
if nationalists’ principal focus was on partition, rather than the everyday experiences of Catholics. Yet, Irish nationalism’s
vociferous and obdurate attitude, its failure to acknowledge, much less engage with, political realities, and refusal to seek
compromise with unionism, simply exacerbated the problem it purportedly sought to overcome. Perhaps, however, this was the
point: berating partition was more important than ending it. Bitterly resented among Catholics, partition was a politically useful
distraction in Éire, and particularly for de Valera. The ‘hyper-dignity’ lamented by W.S. Moody in the Derry Journal exemplified
the counterproductive nature of nationalism: quite simply, the louder the protests, the more entrenched partition became, and
the status quo suited unionists. Moreover, Stormont would use Éire’s threats and fear of a disloyal minority to underpin its own
position and refuse to countenance the merest conciliation with the Catholic population or progressive elements within
unionism, while becoming more integrated within the United Kingdom and reasserting Northern Ireland’s Britishness.118 The
victims of this unintentional political symbiosis remained Northern Ireland’s Catholic minority, offered symbolism and little else
from Éire, and suspicion and discrimination from Stormont. The arrival of the Americans, who eschewed involvement in these
ancient feuds, amply demonstrated the starkness of Northern Ireland’s divisions, and between it and Éire and served to
reinforce and perpetuate partition, while drawing Northern Ireland closer to the rest of the United Kingdom than it had been at
any time since its inception.
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